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Abstract
Twin births are often used as an instrument to address selection of women into fertility. However,
recent work shows selection of women into twin birth such that, while OLS estimates tend to be
downward biased, twin-IV estimates will tend to be upward biased. This is pertinent given the
emerging consensus that fertility has limited impacts on women’s labour supply, or on investments in
children. Using data for developing countries and the United States to estimate the trade-off between
fertility and children’s human capital, we demonstrate the nature and size of the bias in the twin-IV
estimator and estimate bounds on the true parameter. (JEL: J12, J13, C13, D13, I12)
1. Introduction
Following Becker (1960), fertility has been modeled jointly with each of investments in
children, and women’s labour force participation. On account of the average tendency
for negative selection into high fertility, linear least squares estimates of the association
of fertility with children’s human capital, or with women’s employment tend to be
downward biased (that is, to be “too negative” or to over-estimate the trade-off). Since
the pioneering work of Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a,b), a considerable literature
has attempted to address this by using twins to instrument fertility. The premise is that
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twin births are quasi-random, so that the event of a twin birth constitutes a “natural”
natural experiment (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000).
In a recent paper, we presented new population-level evidence that challenges
this premise (Bhalotra and Clarke 2019). Using individual data for 17 million births
in 72 countries, we demonstrated that indicators of the mother’s health, her health-
related behaviours, and the prenatal health environment are systematically positively
associated with the probability of a twin birth. The estimated associations are large,
evident in richer and poorer countries, evident even among women who do not use IVF,
and hold for sixteen different measures of health. We provided evidence that selective
miscarriage is the likely mechanism. The upshot of our findings is that women who
have twin births are positively selected on unobservables related to health. If, as
is plausible (and we will demonstrate), those unobservables are correlated with the
outcome of interest (child human capital or women’s labour force participation), then
twin-instrumented estimates of the relationship between fertility and these outcomes
will tend to be upwards biased (i.e., to move towards a null-estimate when there is an
underlying trade-off).1
This is pertinent as it could resolve the ambiguity of the available evidence on these
relationships. Some recent studies using the twin instrument reject the presence of a
quantity-quality (QQ) trade-off (Black et al. 2005; Ca´ceres-Delpiano 2006; Angrist
et al. 2010; Åslund and Gro¨nqvist 2010; Fitzsimons and Malde 2014), challenging a
long-standing theoretical prior of Becker (1960), Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker
and Tomes (1976).2 Similarly, research using the twin instrument finds that additional
children have relatively little influence on women’s labour market participation, at
least after the first few years (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980b; Bronars and Grogger
1994; Jacobsen et al. 1999; Vere 2011). We argue that, in principle, addressing the
omission of maternal health related variables could adjust for the upwards bias in these
studies, and provide a true estimate of the trade-offs. In practice, maternal health is
multi-dimensional and almost impossible to fully measure and adjust for. To take a few
examples, foetal health is potentially a function of whether pregnant women skip break-
fast (Mazumder and Seeskin 2015), whether they suffer bereavement in pregnancy
(Black et al. 2016), and fetal exposure to air pollution (Chay and Greenstone 2003).
In this paper, we investigate how inference in a literature concerned with causal
effects of fertility on human capital can proceed with partial adjustment and bounding.
We first illustrate the hypothesized direction of the bias of the twin-IV estimator, by
introducing available controls for maternal health in the estimation in linear and non-
linear models. Since covariate adjustment is necessarily partial, we proceed to estimate
bounds on the IV estimates. Given that the first stage (twins predicting fertility) is
1. A recent study proposes a formal test of instrument invalidity (Kitagawa 2015). Albeit with restricted
controls, we will show that this test rejects the twin instrument in our data.
2. More recent studies that produce a trade-off once a linearity assumption is relaxed are discussed in
what follows and in the following section. The QQ trade-off refers to the inverse relationship between
fertility and human capital investment or attainment in a family, posited by Becker and co-authors. Unless
we refer to the original “QQ” model of Becker and coauthors (where “child quality” refers to human
capital), we will henceforth refer to this as a trade-off between fertility and human capital investment or
attainment, rather than use the word “quality”.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvz058/5686856 by guest on 07 January 2020
Bhalotra and Clarke The Twin Instrument: Fertility and Human Capital Investment 3
powerful, we follow Conley et al. (2012) in estimating bounds on the premise that
twin births are plausibly if not strictly exogenous. We also estimate bounds under the
different assumptions of Nevo and Rosen (2012), using twin births as an “imperfect
instrumental variable”. Both of these bounding procedures are based on linear IV
models, but we document how they compare with the non-parametric “Monotone IV”
bounds of Manski and Pepper (2000), which are based on weaker assumptions.
We provide estimates for the United States using about 225,000 births, drawn from
the US National Health Interview Surveys (NHIS) for 2004–2014, and for a pooled
sample of developing countries, containing more than 1 million births in 68 countries
over 20 years, available from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). These data
are chosen because they contain information on child outcomes and maternal health.
Consistently using these two samples allows us to assess the generality of our findings,
and it allows that the relationship of interest, as well as the violation of the exclusion
restriction that concerns us, are different in richer versus poorer countries.
We start by briefly demonstrating, on the particular data samples used in this
analysis, our earlier result that the probability of twin birth is significantly positively
associated with indicators of maternal health. We then set the stage by showing
the routine OLS and twin-IV estimates on our data samples. The OLS estimates
suggest a fertility–human capital trade-off and, following Altonji et al. (2005) to gauge
the importance of unobservables, we conclude that accounting for unobservables is
unlikely to dissolve the trade-off. Yet the twin-IV estimates replicate, in our samples,
the finding in a number of recent studies that there is no discernible trade-off. However,
we find that adjusting for available maternal health related characteristics, even though
these are only a small subset of the range of relevant indicators, leads to emergence of
a trade-off.
For instance, in samples with at least three births, an additional child is associated
with lower human capital outcomes for the first two births: in linear IV models with
the most complete set of controls, this is estimated as 0.05 s.d. for years of education
in developing countries (0.16 fewer years of education), and 0.06 s.d. for an index
of child health in the United States, and in the sample with at least two births it is
0.10 s.d. for grade progression in the United States (or 0.38 fewer grades progressed).
If instead we consider estimates that pool twin-instrumented fertility movements at
parities 2, 3 and 4, these estimates are, respectively, 0.04 s.d. (0.12 years of education
in developing countries), 0.01 s.d. for the child health index in the United States, and
0.08 s.d. for education in the US sample (0.3 grades progressed).3,4
3. We will discuss the relevance of each of the indicators of human capital chosen. In particular, we show
evidence using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) that grade progression in the United
States is (i) a function of parental investment measured as reading with the child, and (ii) that it predicts
completed educational attainment.
4. Since conception of monozygotic (MZ) twins is thought to be quasi-random even if conception of
dizygotic (DZ) twins is not (Farbmacher et al. 2016), we subjected our argument to a harsher test by using
only same-sex twins to construct the twin instrument, same-sex twins being more likely to be MZ. We still
observe the QQ trade-off diverging from zero and becoming significant when controls for maternal health
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The bounds we estimate also confirm the presence of a trade-off at certain parities.
Bound end points for the pooled samples based on “plausible exogeneity methods”
are 0.04 to 0.05 s.d. for education in developing countries (0.12–0.15 fewer years
of education), 0.01 to 0.02 for a health index in the United States, and 0.077 to
0.094 s.d. for education in the United States (0.3–0.36 fewer grades progressed).
These values all refer to the lower and upper bounds themselves, rather than to
the confidence intervals of the bounds. We place these effect sizes in perspective
in Section 4.2.4.5
Observe that IV point estimates suggest that the trade-off is not smaller in the
United States than in developing countries. This is important given that the recent
studies, cited previously, arguing there is no trade-off are set in richer countries, and
one may be tempted to conclude that the trade-off may exist only in poorer countries
where a larger share of families is credit constrained. This said, the US sample is
considerably smaller than the developing country sample and confidence intervals on
both the IV estimates and the partially identified bounds are correspondingly wider.
For example, the 95% confidence intervals on the aforementioned bounds estimates
span from 0.012 to 0.068 in the developing country sample, and from 0.046 to
0.078 (US health) or 0.012 to 0.18 (US education). We also note here that we will
later show that the trade-off is clearer in the United States among families in which
the mother does not have a college education.
Although our focus is on our innovation—on invalidity of the twin instrument
deriving from healthier women being more likely to give birth to twins—we incorporate
in the analysis other recent innovations in the literature that bear upon inference or
interpretation in twin-IV studies. We investigate whether our argument is robust to
these other innovations. We check whether introducing controls changes the complier
group and LATE identified in the linear IV model. We look at two potential issues here.
First, following Angrist et al. (2010) and Angrist and Imbens (1995) who describe the
weighting functions over parities induced by instrumental variation, we investigate
how the weighting function changes conditional on controls for maternal health and
education—and we find it does not significantly change. Second, we consider what
heterogeneity in the estimates (as in Brinch et al. 2017 for instance) implies for the
coefficient movements in 2SLS estimates that arise from conditioning on additional
covariates. We explain that the weighting on different households will depend positively
on the rate of twinning (provided that the proportion of twins is less than 0.5). Given
that we provide evidence that positively selected groups (women with higher education
or better health) (a) have weaker (less negative) QQ trade-offs, and (b) higher rates
of twinning, the inclusion of additional covariates gives more weight to groups with
smaller QQ trade-offs, and so our argument likely holds a fortiori.
are included. This is what we would expect since our argument pertains to the role of maternal health not
in determining conception but instead in ensuring survival of twin conceptions to birth.
5. We investigate if using the sex-mix instrument of Angrist et al. (2010) together with the twin instrument,
as in Chesher and Rosen (2013, 2018), tightens the linear bounds but find that, as it is quite weak, it does
not.
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We follow Brinch et al. (2017) and Mogstad and Wiswall (2016) in estimating
non-linear models that allow the trade-off to vary with the parity at which twins
are born. These authors made the point that once the common linearity assumption
is relaxed, a trade-off emerges, at least at some parities and for some households.
We confirm their results on new data samples. We extend their specification to
include controls for maternal characteristics and interactions between parity and every
maternal characteristic. Controlling for characteristics additively increases the trade-
off (makes the coefficient more negative), and further allowing these controls to have
different effects at different parities makes point estimates even more negative. Thus
our argument continues to hold in this much richer model.
In an extension of the main analysis, we investigate the twin-IV critique of
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009), which draws attention to the fact that twins have lower
birth endowments than their siblings, which may lead to reinforcing or compensating
parental investments.6 We assess parental investment responses to twins on our data
samples (incorporating the NLSY for the United States) and consider how any nonzero
responses influence interpretation of our results. Since we find that some parental
responses vary systematically with the mother’s education (reading with the child
does, breastfeeding responses are similar across education groups), we repeat the
main analysis to investigate bias adjustment for mothers with versus without college-
education. We conclude that we can more readily sign the bias in cases where parents
do not compensate and, for the indicators and data samples we analyse, this is for less
educated mothers.7
The results indicate that marginal increases in fertility often lead to diminished
investments in the human capital of children, and the trade-off is not negligibly small.
This is important, especially in view of growing evidence of the long run dynamic
benefits of childhood investments (Heckman et al. 2013). These estimates put back on
the stage the issue of a potential human capital cost to fertility. Governments actively
devise policies to influence fertility, for instance, countries like China have penalized
fertility, whereas many countries including Italy and Canada have incentivized it, often
with non-linear rules.8 Moreover, advocates of policies encouraging smaller families
rest their case on larger families investing less in each child, limiting human capital
accumulation and living standards (Galor and Weil 2000; Moav 2005). Although we do
6. The literature often uses birth weight as an indicator of the birth endowment. We show that the impact
of close birth spacing between twins on always-taker families and on complier families will interact with
our IV estimates in the same way as the lower birth weight of twins.
7. We find that parents in developing countries and the United States reinforce endowments in their
breastfeeding behaviour. In the United States, for which data on this additional investment are available,
we find that college-educated women (only) compensate the endowment when reading with the child.
8. As discussed in Mogstad and Wiswall (2016), families with children receive special treatment under
the tax and transfer provisions in 28 of the 30 Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation
countries (OECD 2002). Many of these policies are designed such that they reduce the cost of having a
single child more than the cost of having two or more children, in effect promoting smaller families. For
example, welfare benefits or tax credits are, in many cases, reduced or even cut off after reaching a certain
number of children.
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not directly analyse women’s labour supply as an outcome, the analysis here suggests
that it is likely to have a stronger relationship with fertility than existing twin-IV
estimates suggest.
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we formalize the bias in
the OLS and twin-IV estimators in the linear and non-linear models, and describe the
partial identification methodologies for estimating the fertility–human capital trade-off
using twins. In Section 3 we describe the microdata, the measures of human capital
analysed, the construction of parity-specific and pooled samples, and the empirical
strategy. Section 4 presents all results, including estimates of the linear, non-linear and
partial identification methods proposed, and extensions including the role of parental
behaviour, and heterogeneity by mother’s education. Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodology—Biases and Bounds
2.1. Estimating the Quantity–Quality Trade-Off with Twins
A long-standing theoretical result in the literature on human capital formation is the
existence of a QQ trade-off (Becker 1960; Becker and Lewis 1973; Willis 1973; De
Tray 1973; Becker and Tomes 1976). The essential idea of these studies is that the
shadow price of child quality is increasing in child quantity and vice versa. This
provides behavioural micro-foundations consistent with an empirical regularity that
has been noted in cross-sectional and time series data, which is that children from
large families have weaker educational outcomes (Blake 1989; Hanushek 1992; Galor
2012). This empirical regularity is also evident in the data sets we analyse from the
United States and developing countries (see Online Appendix Figures A.1 and A.2).
However, as discussed in the previous section, empirical evidence of a fertility–
human capital trade-off is ambiguous. Early work including Hanushek (1992) and
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b) documented significant negative effects of additional
births within a family on average child educational outcomes. Since then, research has
found estimates of no significant relationship (Black et al. 2005; Ca´ceres-Delpiano
2006; Angrist et al. 2010; Åslund and Gro¨nqvist 2010; Fitzsimons and Malde 2014), a
significantly positive relationship (Qian 2009) and a significantly negative relationship
(Grawe 2008; Lee 2008; Ponczek and Souza 2012; Bougma et al. 2015; Mogstad and
Wiswall 2016; Brinch et al. 2017), see the review in Clarke (2018).9 The two studies
of Brinch et al. (2017) and Mogstad and Wiswall (2016) show that where the usual
twin-IV approach identifies no significant relationship, allowing for non-linear and
non-monotonic effects of family fertility on children’s education leads to emergence
of a negative relationship. A trade-off has emerged also in studies that, rather than
9. Black et al. (2005) show that OLS estimates of the trade-off in their Norwegian sample are sensitive
to controlling for birth order. We find this is not the case in our data samples.
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use instrumental variables, use quasi-experimental variation in either the quantity or
“quality” of children.10
In this section we formalize the biases that concern us. We start with the standard
linear model and we then develop the non-linear case.11
2.1.1. Linear Fertility Models. OLS. Analyses of the fertility–human capital trade-
off aim to arrive at a causal estimate of ˇ1 in the following model:
yij D ˇ0 C ˇ1 fertilityj C Xˇx C "ij : (1)
Here, yij is a measure of human capital attainment of or investment in child i in
family j , and fertilityj is the number of children in family j . The vector X includes
relevant (exogenous) family and child level covariates. As discussed in Section 3, we
consider two measures of human capital: a standardized measure of education, and a
measure of health. A fertility–human capital trade-off implies that ˇ1 < 0. As has been
extensively discussed in a previous literature, estimation of ˇ1 using OLS will result in
biased coefficients given that child human capital and fertility are jointly determined
(Becker and Lewis 1973; Becker and Tomes 1976), and relevant parental behaviours
and attributes that influence both fertility decisions and investments in children’s human
capital are unobserved, and relegated to the error term (Qian 2009). The direction of
the OLS bias is determined by the sign on the conditional correlation between fertilityj
and the relevant omitted factors in "ij . If mothers with weaker unobserved preferences
for investing in children (or other unobserved constraints to investing in child human
capital) have more children, OLS estimates will overstate the magnitude of the true
trade-off.
IV. Following the seminal work of Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b), fertility has
been instrumented with the incidence of twin births on the premise that they constitute
an exogenous shock to family size. The first stage linear projection can be written as
fertilityj D 0 C 1twinj C Xx C ij ; (2)
10. For instance, Bhalotra et al. (2018) show that the sharp improvement in newborn health (quality)
following the introduction of antibiotics led to lower fertility and, Bhalotra and Venkataramani (2015)
verify that the children born in that era had higher education and income. Similarly, Ager et al. (2018)
find that vaccinations that reduced child mortality led to lower fertility. Bailey et al. (2019) show that
access to family planning led to higher quality births. Anukriti et al. (2016) show that the introduction
of technology facilitating sex-selective abortion that (selectively) reduced the quantity of girls born led to
higher investments in surviving girls.
11. The twin instrument has also been used to estimate effects of childbearing on women’s labour force
participation with varying results (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980a; Angrist and Evans 1998; Jacobsen et al.
1999), and to estimate the consequences of out of wedlock births on marriage market outcomes, poverty
and welfare receipt (Bronars and Grogger 1994). The discussion here applies to these cases as well. In this
paper we focus nearly exclusively on the internal validity of twins estimates (IV consistency). In recent
work, Aaronson et al. (2017) and Bisbee et al. (2017) examine the external validity of IV estimates of the
relationship between fertility and female labour supply using either twins or the sex-mix of the first two
births as instruments. Still, as observed in Bhalotra and Clarke (2019), our estimates suggest considerable
heterogeneity by country income levels.
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where twinj is an indicator for whether the nth birth in family j is a twin birth.
EŒ.1; twinj ; X/0ij  D 0 by construction. As described further in Section 3, a series of
samples are constructed, referred to as the nC groups, and consisting of children born
before birth n in families with at least n births. The idea is that children born prior to
birth n (subjects) are randomly assigned either one sibling (the control group) or two
siblings (the treatment group) at the nth birth. Comparing these allows us to estimate
causal impacts of the additional birth on the child outcome. The twins themselves are
excluded from the estimation sample.12 If twins are a valid instrument, the parameter
ˇ1 can be consistently estimated by IV where equation (1) is the second stage. In
particular, for validity we require Cov.twinj ; "ij / D 0, or that the occurrence of twins
is uncorrelated with unobserved factors conditional on observables X. We turn to this
in what follows, and discuss additional threats to the exclusion restriction related to
parental behaviour in Section 4.2.5.
Bhalotra and Clarke (2019) provide evidence that omitted variables indicating
maternal health and relegated to "ij are correlated with twinning, and in Section 4.1
we document this for the data used in this paper. If healthier mothers invest more in
their pregnancies (e.g., by averting smoking before birth) and also invest more in their
children after birth, then the twin-IV estimates will be inconsistent. There is some
evidence for instance in Uggla and Mace (2016) that healthier mothers (indicated by
health measures such as used in our earlier work) invest more in children in a range of
domains. Provided that 1 > 0, implying that twinning increases fertility, (something
consistently observed in data), positive selection of mothers of twins implies:
plimN!1
1
N
NX
iD1
twinj  "ij > 0 , plimN!1 OˇIV1 > ˇ1;
where OˇIV1 signifies that ˇ1 was estimated using the twin instrument in equation (2).
We can partition the stochastic error term from equation (1) into a vector of
observable measures of mother’s health capital (H), socioeconomic variables (S), and
all other unobserved components, as "ij D H C S C "ij . Assuming a positive (or zero)
covariance between the three components of the error term,13 the step-by-step removal
of twin selection predictors will result in the estimated coefficient becoming continually
closer to the true parameter. Thus, provided any changes in first stage estimates across
12. This takes care of the concern that since twins tend to be born with weaker endowments (e.g., birth
weight), they will tend to have systematically different quality outcomes. Using data from the United
States, Almond et al. (2005) document that twins have substantially lower birth weight, lower APGAR
scores, higher use of assisted ventilation at birth and lower gestation period than singletons. We document
similar endowment differences in our data samples (Online Appendix Figures A.3 and A.4).
13. Given that the covariance between elements of S and H is found to be positive, and given that the
covariance between each of these and other unobserved variables that positively affect child human capital
are also likely to be positive, it is very likely that each covariance term is positive. This is tested later in
this paper when examining IV estimates.
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specifications are of second order importance14:
plim OˇIV1 > plim OˇIV;S1 > plim OˇIV;SCH1 > ˇ1: (3)
The coefficients OˇIV;H1 and OˇIV;SCH1 refer to coefficients in a model augmented to
control for observable health capital H, and then also observable socioeconomic status
S. Since, as discussed further in Section 4.1, all determinants of twin birth are virtually
impossible to account for, the twin-IV will over-estimate ˇ1, under-estimating the
magnitude of the fertility–human capital trade-off if ˇ1 < 0, although addition of
predictors of twins as controls will lead to the IV estimate approaching the true value
from above.
Although inequality 3 suggests that the inclusion of additional covariates will cause
the IV estimate to approach the parameter of interest, the addition of controls in a 2SLS
model implies that the composition of the LATE estimate will change. In particular,
the LATE estimate is based on a weighted average of covariate specific LATEs and
variation in fertility induced by the instrument at different parities (Angrist and Imbens
1995). So, under heterogeneity, the inclusion of additional covariates may change the
IV estimate, independent of any selection into twinning. In Section 4.2.2 we consider
this explicitly, documenting that coefficient movements observed owe to twin selection
in this case.
Pooled IV Models. In the following section we motivate and describe the use of a
series of samples, varying in the parity at which the potential twin birth occurs. As
IV estimates are considerably less precise than OLS estimates, we follow Angrist
et al. (2010) and Mogstad and Wiswall (2012) in presenting parity-pooled estimates in
certain cases to gain power. Consider pooling the 2C, 3C and 4C samples, which are
first born children in families with at least two births, first and second born children in
families with at least 3 births, and first to third born children in families with at least
four births. In this case, fertility is instrumented with the variables twin2j ; twin3j and
twin4j , which are defined as
twincj D
(
0; if fertilityj < c
twincj  OEŒtwincj jXj ; fertilityj  c; if fertilityj  c
(4)
for each c 2 2; 3; 4. Replacing twin from equation (2) with twin resolves the
problem that in the pooled sample, the twin instrument will be missing for certain
parity groups. For example, for observations in the 2+ group who are in a sibling
group of two, the twin at third birth and twin at fourth birth variables will not be
14. These inequalities come about given that conditional correlations between twin
j
and the stochastic
error term are reduced by the inclusion of relevant omitted variables. However, the inclusion of additional
covariates will also impact the first stage estimates. Thus, for these inequalities in limits to hold, we require
changes in first stage estimates to be second order. It is useful to note that later in the paper, we typically
observe first stage estimates to be weakly increasing with the addition of controls, which only serves to
reinforce these inequalities.
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defined, given that these births have not occurred. twinj is a valid instrument under the
same twin exogeneity assumptions as in the linear IV models (Mogstad and Wiswall
2012). For each observation, twincj is formed by assigning a value of 0 if the family
has not reached a particular fertility threshold, and for those who have, generated
as twincj  OEŒtwincj jXj ; cj  c, where OEŒtwincj jXj ; cj  c is a non-parametric
estimate of the conditional mean of the probability of twin birth in the non-missing
subsample. The validity of this procedure is demonstrated in Angrist et al. (2010) and
Mogstad and Wiswall (2012, 2016).
2.1.2. Non-Linear Models. Theoretical statements of the QQ model tend to assume,
for simplicity, that all children in a family have the same endowments and receive the
same parental investment. Recent theoretical (Aizer and Cunha 2012) and empirical
(Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009; Bagger et al. 2013; Mogstad and Wiswall 2016;
Brinch et al. 2017) papers relax this assumption. Among other things, this allows
for reinforcing or compensating behaviours in parental investment choices (Almond
and Mazumder 2013), something we explicitly consider later. This implies allowing
the coefficient ˇ1 to vary across children in the family.
In this paper we focus initially on linear IV models given that it allows us to
document our bias argument in a setting used in the majority of papers estimating
the fertility–human-capital trade-off. However, when using data for which we have
sufficient power to split instruments, we estimate non-linear marginal fertility models
as in Brinch et al. (2017) and Mogstad and Wiswall (2016). Following Mogstad and
Wiswall (2016), this consists of the following 2SLS procedure (illustrated for the
two-plus sample):
fertilitysj D s2twin2j C s3twin3j C s4twin4j C s5twin5j
C XXs C sj ; for s D 2; : : : ; 5 (5)
yij D ˛0 C ˛1fertility2j C 2˛fertility3j C ˛3fertility4j C ˛4fertility5j
C X˛X C ij ; (6)
where fertilitysj is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if fertilityj  s, (5) are
a series of first stages for each fertility indicator, and (6) is the second stage estimate
of the effect of an additional child after s births on the human capital of the first born
child. As the estimation sample consists of families with at least two births, twin2j ,
a binary variable for a twin at the second birth, is defined for all families. However,
when moving to higher birth orders, twin3j is not defined for families with only two
births. We thus follow Mogstad and Wiswall (2016) in replacing higher-order twin
birth indicators with the twincj instruments defined in equation (4). We also follow
Mogstad and Wiswall (2016) in considering family sizes up to 6 children. Although
the specifications (5) and (6) are for the two-plus sample, we estimate analogous
specifications for the three-plus sample, and four-plus sample, where in each case we
only consider the marginal impacts of fertility at birth orders greater than the birth
orders of the children included in the estimation sample.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvz058/5686856 by guest on 07 January 2020
Bhalotra and Clarke The Twin Instrument: Fertility and Human Capital Investment 11
As our interest in this paper is in examining the impact of positively selected twin
births, we estimate the previous specifications in two circumstances: the first, following
exactly the procedure laid out in Mogstad and Wiswall (2016) where twins are assumed
to be exogenous, and the second where we additionally control for observable health
and socioeconomic predictors of twins in equations (5) and (6).
2.2. Estimating IV Bounds with an Imperfect Instrument
Given that we can never fully control for maternal health even with the full set
of observable controls, point estimation of the fertility–human capital trade-off is
not possible, see Bhalotra and Clarke (2019) for a complete discussion. However,
under additional assumptions relating to the failure of the IV exclusion restriction, or
correlations between the instrument, the endogenous variable, and unobservables we
can bound the fertility–human capital trade-off. As there appears to be no alternative
instrument for fertility that has not been critiqued, we investigate different procedures
for bounding the trade-off using the twin instrument. Two of these are recent bounding
procedures for linear IV models. We also briefly consider non-parametric monotone
IV bounds that are comparable to non-linear models but that tend to deliver wider
bounds.
First we describe our use of the Nevo and Rosen (2012) “Imperfect IV” procedure.
This is ideally suited to the current context because it suggests that if twins are
positively selected, if fertility is negatively selected, and if twinning and fertility
are positively correlated, then the true parameter will be bounded by the OLS and
the IV estimate discussed previously.15 If we are willing to additionally assume that
the twin instrument is “less endogenous” than fertility (Nevo and Rosen’s assumption
4), we can tighten the bounds by forming a compound instrument based on the
endogenous fertility variable, and the imperfect twin instrument. This instrument,
(V D fertilityTwinj  Twin fertilityj ), where  refers to the standard deviation, can
provide tighter bounds on the ˇ1 parameter where OˇVIV  ˇ1  OˇtwinIV , suggesting end
points for a series of IV bounds on the parameter ˇ1.
The parameters OˇVIV and OˇtwinIV give end points of the bounds. To conduct
inference we follow the Adaptive Inequality Selection (AIS) procedure described
in Chernozhukov et al. (2013). This accounts for the fact that there are potentially
multiple moment conditions giving upper and lower bounds, and uncertainty related to
each moment restriction must be accounted for when generating confidence intervals.
Using the algorithm described in Chernozhukov et al. (2015, p. 27), we consistently
15. We can follow the notation of Nevo and Rosen (2012) precisely if we multiply twins by 1, as their
assumptions and lemmas are based on identically signed correlations between the endogenous variable and
unobservables, and the IV and unobservables. In our case, once twins is multiplied by 1, this assumption
is met assuming negative fertility selection and positive twin selection: 
xu

zu
 0, where  denotes
correlation. In the notation of our paper, x refers to fertility in equation (1), z refers to twin in equation (2), u
refers to the unobservable stochastic term "
ij
in 1. Then, under Nevo and Rosen (2012, Lemma 1), 
xz
< 0,
or the negative of twins and fertility will be negatively correlated, and as such Oˇ twinIV  ˇ1  OˇOLS .
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report both the end points on the Nevo and Rosen bounds, as well as their 95%
confidence intervals. We have programmed this estimator for Stata (Clarke and Matta
2018).
The Nevo and Rosen (2012) procedure is straightforward and relies on fairly
weak assumptions. In particular, the only assumptions we require are that (i) there is
negative selection into fertility. This a common stance in the literature (Qian 2009),
and one that is verified in surveys querying fertility preferences, which show that less
educated women desire more children (e.g., Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010); (ii) twins
are positively selected, which is shown using a variety of data sources and measures of
maternal health in Bhalotra and Clarke (2019), (iii) twin births are positively associated
with fertility, which we show in the first stage regressions in what follows, and (iv)
there is less selection into twin birth than into fertility, which seems reasonable.
The upper bound in the case of Nevo and Rosen is given by the original twin IV
estimate OˇtwinIV . From equation (3) we know that positive selection of twins inflates
this IV estimate upwards. As such, to offer a more informative identification region
at the upper bound, we also implement an alternative approach to inference for IV
models developed by Conley et al. (2012) for cases when the instrument is plausible
but fails the exclusion restriction. They provide an operational definition of plausibly
(or approximately) exogenous instruments, defining a parameter  that reflects how
close the exclusion restriction is to being satisfied in the following model (adapted to
the fertility–human capital model for this paper):
yij D ı0 C ı1fertilityj C  twinj C Xıx C #ij: (7)
Since the parameters ı1 and  are not jointly identified, prior information or
assumptions about  are used to obtain estimates of the parameter of interest, ı1.
The IV exclusion restriction is equivalent to imposing ex ante that  is precisely equal
to zero. Rather than assuming this holds exactly, one can define plausible exogeneity as
a situation in which  is nearly, but not precisely equal to zero. Estimating or imposing
some (weaker) restriction on  buys the identifying information to bound the parameter
of interest, even when the IV exclusion restriction does not hold exactly. Conley et al.
(2012) state that “Manski and Pepper (2000) consider treatment effect bounds with
instruments that are assumed to monotonically impact conditional expectations, which
is roughly analogous to assuming  2 Œ0;1”. They state that their procedure is hence
an extension of the Manski and Pepper procedure.
The approach in Conley et al. is ideally suited to the empirical application of this
paper because they show that their bounds are most informative when the instruments
are strong, and the twin instrument is strong (evidence in what follows). In Section 4.1,
we provide evidence that leads us to suspect that  will not equal zero. Specifically,
 is the degree to which twin mothers are healthier than non-twin mothers multiplied
by the effect of (unobserved) maternal health on child quality. If one or other of these
conditional correlations is equal to zero, IV estimates will not be inconsistent.16
16. Section 4.1 only shows that twin mothers are healthier than mothers of singletons. To complement
this, we also show in what follows a series of positive associations of maternal health with both investments
in children and child quality outcomes.
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Conley et al. (2012) show that bounds for the IV parameter ˇ1 from equation (1)
can be generated under a series of assumptions regarding  . These include a simple
assumption regarding the support of  (their “Union of Confidence Intervals”, or UCI,
approach), or a fully specified prior for the distribution of  (their “Local to Zero”,
or LTZ, approach). In the latter case, a correctly specified prior often leads to tighter
bounds. We follow both strategies, the first is agnostic, placing little structure over
the violation of the exclusion restriction by simply allowing a large range to capture
uncertainty over  , and the second involves assuming a distribution to capture the
uncertainty in  . When we present bounds based on the LTZ approach, we document
bounds under a range of assumed distributions. Once again, in the case of Conley
et al. (2012) we present both bound end points (in the case of the UCI approach) or
midpoints (in the case of the LTZ approach), as well as the 95% confidence intervals
on these partially identified bounds. In each case, we follow the inference procedures
documented to have asymptotic coverage of at least 95% in Conley et al. (2012), which
are implemented following Clarke and Matta (2018).
In general, the Conley et al. (2012) procedure relies on additional assumptions, as
we must form a prior over the magnitude of the failure of the exclusion restriction,
whereas in Nevo and Rosen (2012) we only need to provide the sign.17 The advantage
of the Conley et al. procedure that makes it worthwhile despite its stronger assumptions
is that it potentially returns tighter bounds at both the upper and lower end, whereas
Nevo and Rosen retains the original IV upper bound and only tightens the lower bound
using information from the original OLS estimates.
Both of these bounds procedures are based upon the linear IV model that has been
routinely used in the twin QQ literature. However, as described in Section 2.1.2, we
will relax the linear assumption and investigate the potential impact of positive twin
selection in non-linear models such as in Mogstad and Wiswall (2016). Manski and
Pepper (2000) describe a non-parametric procedure allowing us to estimate bounds
on average treatment effects of a family moving from any fertility level s to any
other fertility level t , such that s > t . This bounds procedure is based on a Monotone
IV assumption, which is suitable in our case, requiring that investments in children
are weakly higher among women with twin births than those with singleton births,
given positive selection of women into twin births. However, these bound are typically
estimated invoking additional assumptions—either “Monotone Treatment Selection”
(MTS) or “Monotone Treatment Response” (MTR). In our case these additional
assumptions are not justified, given that they assume a weakly increasing relationship
between child outcomes and fertility reductions, while our goal is precisely to estimate,
rather than assume, this relationship. Invoked alone, Monotone IV bounds are typically
wide, as they are based on a similar logic to the “worst case” (or “no assumptions”)
bounds in Manski (1989). That these non-parametric bounds are uninformative in this
context has been documented in other settings, for example, Brinch et al. (2017). We
17. It is worth noting however, that the Conley et al. procedure allows for cases where the prior over 
is of indeterminate sign, which Nevo and Rosen (2012) does not.
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nevertheless present these bounds along with their full derivation in Online Appendix
D, in order to assess the relative benefits of the updated bounding procedures described
in this section. In this Online Appendix we also present joint MTS–MTR bounds for
completeness, though note that these bounds impose that a fertility–human capital
trade-off exists, and so are only informative for the lower-bound, rather than the
existence of the trade-off per se.
The bounds from Manski and Pepper (2000), Conley et al. (2012) and Nevo and
Rosen (2012) all relax the IV assumption of a strict exclusion restriction. The lack of
point identification comes with the benefit of allowing that there is positive selection
of twin birth. An alternative set of IV bounds has been described in Chesher and
Rosen (2013, 2018) for discrete IV models, where set, rather than point, identification
owes to a complete non-parametric specification of the underlying model, additionally
leading to the potential to estimate an ATE rather than a LATE. However, in these
cases, typically some form of independence is assumed for the IV (including weaker-
than-standard independence assumptions, such as conditional mean independence or
conditional quantile independence). Given that our interest in bounds in this setting
is principally in accounting for failure of IV independence assumptions, we do not
estimate these bounds. An example of generalized IV bounds based on the twin
instrument and an independence assumption can be found in Chesher and Rosen (2018).
3. Data and Estimation
We shall consistently estimate OLS and twin-IV estimates employing microdata from
the United States and a sample of 68 developing countries. In order to estimate
specification 1, augmented with health and SES controls, we require information on
sibling-linked births, measures of child human capital, and characteristics of the mother
that include indicators of her health in addition to the more commonly available age,
race and education. The data we use are chosen to satisfy these requirements. These
are the US NHIS, which have been fielded in an identical way for the years 2004–2014,
and the DHS for 68 countries, which have been applied over 20 years using a broadly
similar design. To examine parental investments, we use the NLSY.
The NHIS is an ongoing household survey released yearly in the United States
from 1957. The survey has been updated every 10 or 15 years, and as such, we focus
on a particular time period (2004–2014) which ensures we can generate all variables
in a consistent way. It is representative of the population of (non-institutionalized)
US residents and has a household file, a family file, a sample adult and a sample
child file. The household and family files give basic demographic information on each
household member and other basic demographic outcomes, and the sample adult and
child files provide more in depth health information on one particular adult and child in
the family. Our sample is generated using all mothers who are included in the sample
adult file, and so for whom health measures are recorded, and this is merged with
demographic information and information on all child outcomes from the family and
household files. We do not use the sample child files given that we require consistent
measures of outcomes for all children in the family.
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FIGURE 1. Twins shift the fertility distribution outwards. Densities of family size come from the
full estimation samples from DHS and NHIS data. Kernel densities are plotted (bandwidth equals
two in all cases), and present the frequency of the total number of children per family by family type.
The DHS implements standardized questionnaires across countries (see Online
Appendix Table A.1 for the full list of countries in our microdata) on nationally
representative samples of reproductive-age women (15–49 years). It includes a
household questionnaire recording basic information on each household member
including children (such as their sex, education and relationship to the household
head), and a women’s questionnaire to eligible women in the household. The latter is
more extensive, recording, among other things, each woman’s full fertility history and
health and socioeconomic characteristics including her height, BMI, and education.
Our data consist of a merged file of all reproductive age women from the women’s
questionnaire with information on their children’s educational attainment from the
household questionnaire.
Online Appendix Table A.2 provides summary statistics for the DHS and NHIS
data. Fertility and maternal characteristics are described at the level of the mother,
whereas child education and health outcomes are described at the level of the child.
Twin births make up 1.98% of all births in the DHS sample, and 2.57% in the NHIS
sample. As expected, twin families are larger than non-twin families. Figure 1 describes
total fertility in twin and non-twin families. The distribution of family size in families
where at least one twin birth has occurred dominates the distribution for all-singleton
families in both the DHS sample (Figure 1a) and the US sample (Figure 1b). This
establishes the relevance (power) of the twin instrument for fertility, which is formally
assessed in what follows.
Auxiliary Tests on Parental Investment Responses to Endowments. For the extension
we will discuss that investigates parental behaviour we require data on parental
investments in different children at similar points of their children’s lives. For this,
we use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) Children and Young
Adults survey, which registers information on all children born to the original NLSY79
female respondents, and gathers a much wider range of information on parent-child
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interactions. We generate a panel dataset of children based on each biennial survey
through 1988–2012. We will use two measures of investment—whether the mother
reads frequently with the child between ages 6–9 years, and whether the mother
breastfed the child, as both of these are consistently recorded for each child at
comparable stages of the child’s life. For the developing country sample, we use the
duration of breastfeeding in months, available for all children for whom breastfeeding
is completed. These data are analysed in Section 4.2.5.
Estimation Samples. Studies that instrument fertility with the occurrence of a twin
birth leverage the unexpected additional child to study impacts on outcomes of siblings
born before the additional child. Define families with at least two birth events as 2+
families. In this group, we shall compare families in which twins occur at the second
birth event (treated group) with families in which a singleton occurs at second order
(control group). The subjects, for whom we measure indicators of child human capital
(proxies for parental investment) are the first-born children. Following Black et al.
(2005), we similarly construct a 3+ sample that consists of families with at least three
birth events and then we compare outcomes for the first two births across families that
have a twin birth at order three (treated) and families that have a single birth at order
three (control). Many existing studies, such as Angrist et al. (2010), focus upon the 2+
and 3+ samples. Given higher fertility rates in the developing country sample that we
analyse, we also include 4+ families in which twins occur at fourth order and outcomes
are studied for the first three births.
Restricting the sample to families with at least n births in this way primarily ensures
that we avoid selection on preferences over family size. It also addresses the potential
problem that, since the likelihood of a twin birth is increasing in birth order (see Online
Appendix Figure A.5), increasing family size raises the chances of having a twin birth.
In the DHS sample, 42% of all children are in one of the 2+, 3+ or 4+ samples. In the
US sample, this value is 45%. Children will be in none of these samples if they are
either high birth order children, or if they are low birth order children who do not have
older siblings.18
Measures of Human Capital, and Relevance. A measure of child human capital
available in both data sets is educational attainment. Our final estimation sample
consists of children aged 6–18 when surveyed, selected to represent children who have
begun their education but still reside in the same household as their mother. Ideally
we would observe completed education but, to our knowledge, no large datasets are
18. The pooled sample will provide a weighted average of the parity-specific estimates 2+, 3+ and 4+.
It will not include the trade-off induced by twins at 5th or 6th or higher order births because we do not
instrument these, similar to other papers based on the twin IV. Note however that, by design, many of the
subjects of a 5+ family (the children born before birth 5 in a family with at least 5 births) will be in the
samples with twins at birth orders up to order 4, for example, recall that the 4+ sample contains children
born before birth 4 in a family with at least 4 births, so this will include the first 3 children of 5+ families.
The difference is that we are not adding higher order instruments (e.g., twins at birth 5).
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available measuring child’s completed education, mother’s total fertility, and a wide
range of maternal health measures taken before the birth of the child. We would have
liked to use the data used in recent prominent studies of the fertility–human capital
trade-off (Black et al. 2005; Angrist et al. 2010; Mogstad and Wiswall 2016), but the
Israeli data do not contain indicators of maternal condition or maternal behaviours,
and the Norwegian data are not publicly accessible, and additionally contain very few
markers of maternal health.
Since children age 6–18 are in the process of acquiring education, we use an age-
standardized z-score. In the DHS, the reference group consists of children in the same
country and birth cohort, whereas in the NHIS, it consists of children with the same
month and year of birth. Thus coefficients are expressed in standard deviations. The
NHIS also provides a subjectively assessed binary indicator of child health (excellent
or not), which we model as an additional indicator of child human capital.19
We now consider the relevance of the measures of child human capital that we use
in the poor and richer country settings. While schooling rates have been increasing
globally, of 163 developing countries, only 47 have achieved universal primary
education (UNESCO 2005) and in two-thirds of sub-Saharan African countries, more
than 30% of students who start primary school are expected to drop out. Credit
constraints have been identified as a factor (UNESCO 2011), and these tend to tighten
as the number of dependent children increases.
In the United States, although all children stay in school until the legislated
minimum school leaving age, grade retention is (i) common and (ii) a significant marker
of educational progress. It is estimated that over 2.4 million (5%–10%) students are
retained every year in the United States. Rising through the 25 years up to 2003, this
was estimated to cost over 13 billion dollars per year just to pay for the extra year of
schooling (i.e., ignoring its long run costs) (Anderson et al. 2002). Retention rates are
higher among boys, ethnic minorities and children of less educated parents (Warren
et al. 2014). Passage in 2002 of the No Child Left Behind Act in the United States,
with its emphasis on mastery of minimum grade-level competencies as a condition
for promotion, has renewed discussion of grade retention in public policy making.
Systematic reviews examining research over almost a century conclude that grade
retention is one of the strongest predictors of high school dropout, and is associated
with lower earnings in adulthood (Jimerson 1999, 2001; Jimerson et al. 2002; Lavy
et al. 2012; Manacorda 2012).
Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for 1986–2014, and following
students from ages 7 up to their education completed at the age of 25 or older, we
investigated ourselves the associations of grade retention with (i) final attainment and
(ii) parental investment in children. We find that, at every age, children who are behind
19. While we would also like to analyse a health measure in the developing country sample,
anthropometrics are only available for births that occur within five (or fewer) years of the survey, and
infant mortality is unsuitable as the twin-IV estimator involves analysing child human capital for children
born prior to twins who will have already been fully exposed to infant mortality risk by the time the twins
were born.
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FIGURE 2. School completion rates and lifetime educational accumulation. Each point estimate and
95% confidence interval displays the coefficient from a separate regression of an individual’s eventual
completed education on whether the individual was behind his or her cohort at the age indicated
on the horizontal axis. All data from the NLSY79 child and young adult panel are used, covering
individuals who were born to NLSY79 women, and who were children or young adults at some point
between 1986 and 2014. In each survey wave, the individual’s current age and education is reported,
and at the end of the panel survey we observe their eventual completed education. Regressions are
only estimated on observations who are at least 25 years old in the final wave, to ensure that education
is approximately completed. Similar results are observed if we condition on being 30 years old in
the final wave. In each case, an individual is behind their cohort if their grade accumulation is at
least 1 year less than their age minus 6. Each coefficient and point estimate comes from a separate
regression, given that NLSY survey waves occur every 2 years, and so we do not observe the same
sample of respondents at each age.
their cohort in school years end up with significantly lower completed schooling, for
example, final attainment is 1.5 years lower for children who are behind their birth
cohort at age 10 and it is 0.5 years lower for children who are behind at ages 7 or
16 (Figure 2). This alleviates concerns that our school for age measure represents
only a temporal effect, for example, capturing red-shirting or other strategic parental
behaviour. In the Online Appendix (Online Appendix Figure A.6), using the same
data sample, we provide complementary evidence showing that children of parents
who read frequently with their children during the ages of 6–9 years exhibit a lower
likelihood of being behind their cohort in the future, at ages 10–18.
The third measure of child quality we use is a subjective measure of child health.
Beyond its intrinsic value, the long term health and socio-economic payoff to improved
child health is estimated to be large (Almond and Currie 2011). In particular, Case
et al. (2002) and references therein demonstrate that a similar self-reported measure of
health predicts mortality and morbidity in the US population. Full variable definitions
are provided in Online Appendix B.
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Birth Order. The set-up we have just described will yield estimates of the human
capital outcomes for the first born child in the 2+ sample, and estimates that average
over the human capital of the first and second born child in the 3+ sample, and so
on. Like Angrist et al. (2010), we could also show results separating the first and
second born child in the 3+ sample, which we do not do just to conserve power and
because identifying birth order specific effects of family size is not closely related to
our purpose. However, in every specification in the paper, OLS and IV, we control
for birth order fixed effects on the right hand side. These allow for direct impacts
of birth order of the pre-twins on their education. Black et al. (2005) find that the
trade-off (the coefficient on fertility) is eliminated in OLS when controlling for birth
order effects, but this is not the case in our data samples.20 A different consideration
of birth order pertains to the order at which twin births impact completed fertility.
This involves estimating non-linear IV models that allow the trade-off to vary with
birth order (parity) of the twin. We shall do this, following Brinch et al. (2017), for
example. We further allow for interactions between parity and controls for the health
and education of the mother.
4. Results
4.1. Twin Births and Maternal Condition
In Bhalotra and Clarke (2019) we document that mothers with greater health stocks
prior to conception or those who engage in more healthy behaviours or are in a
healthier environment during pregnancy are more likely to take twins to term. In other
words, twins are born to selectively healthy mothers. In order for this to invalidate
twin-IV estimates, two conditions must be satisfied. First, twins must be (positively)
selected conditional on observable controls (non-independence) and second, twins
must have an impact on the outcome of interest beyond that mediated by fertility
(non-excludability). Here we document that this is the case in the two data samples
used in this paper, and direct readers to Bhalotra and Clarke (2019) where additional
evidence in other contexts is presented.
Using the two data sets analysed in this paper, we regress the probability of a
twin birth on indicators of maternal health, holding constant socioeconomic status and
demographic characteristics. The controls were described previously and are listed
in notes to the tables. In the US sample (which is much smaller, limiting statistical
power, see Table 1), twinning is positively associated with mother’s education and
BMI, and negatively associated with the mother’s smoking status prior to the birth.
The smoking indicator is statistically significant even in the pre-IVF period. In Bhalotra
and Clarke (2019) we use the universe of births in the United States, between 2010 and
20. In Online Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5 (OLS) and A.6–A.8 (IV) we show the coefficients on the
birth order fixed effects in the OLS and IV models. Birth order has significant direct effects on education
but it does not eliminate (or attenuate) the estimated trade-off.
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TABLE 1. Probability of giving birth to twins USA (NHIS).
All Time
1982–1990 1991–2013
Mother’s education (years) 0.010 0.020 0.009
(0.005) (0.019) (0.005)
Mother’s height (in.) 0.002 0.007 0.001
(0.004) (0.013) (0.004)
Mother’s BMI 0.001 0.004 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Smoked prior to birth 0.042 0.217 0.027
(0.021) (0.084) (0.022)
Observations 103,249 6,160 96,374
Pseudo R-squared 0.015 0.075 0.015
Notes: This table presents probit regressions of whether each birth is a twin or a singleton on a number of maternal
characteristics. All specifications include a full set of mother’s age, survey year, region of birth, and mother’s race
dummies. Average marginal effects are reported. Height is measured in inches and BMI is weight in kg divided
by height in meters squared. Standard errors are included in parentheses. p < 0.1; p < 0.05; p < 0.01.
2013, and after removing births assisted by Artificial Reproductive procedures such as
IVF, we document negative associations of twinning with diabetes and hypertension
before pregnancy, with smoking before and during pregnancy and with being short
or underweight before pregnancy.21 In Bhalotra and Clarke (2019), we show with
NLSY data that time-varying indicators of maternal health influence the chances of
twin birth conditional on woman fixed effects that purge any genetic influences on
twinning (and also purge the effects of mother’s education). In that earlier paper we
also report estimates using the much larger vital statistics database for the United States
that includes several additional measures of maternal health. Although that evidence
is more compelling, here our purpose is primarily to show that the results hold on the
data that are analysed in this paper.
In the developing country sample (Table 2), we observe that, conditional on
maternal age and country and year of birth fixed effects, twin births are positively
associated with the mother’s education and health, proxied by her height and body
mass index (BMI). In Bhalotra and Clarke (2019), we show that the health indicators
are significant conditional and unconditional on education. These results hold even
in the period before IVF became available (column (5)), and in both low and middle
income countries. We also identify a statistically significant positive impact of public
health availability on the likelihood of twinning (column (6)).22
21. To the extent that educated women exhibit healthier behaviours (Currie and Moretti 2003; Lleras-
Muney and Lichtenberg 2005), education may influence twin births via its impact on health-related
behaviours that we do not have the data to capture directly.
22. We include indicators of prenatal care by doctors or nurses in the mother’s DHS cluster, rather than
the mother’s uptake, as this is potentially endogenous to birth type.
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TABLE 2. Probability of giving birth to twins (developing countries by income and time period).
All Income Time Prenatal
Low inc Middle inc 1990–2013 1972–1989
Mother’s age 0.098 0.100 0.096 0.105 0.071 0.099
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004)
Mother’s age squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age at first birth 0.005 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Mother’s education
(years)
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Mother’s height (cm) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s BMI 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prenatal care (doctor) 0.046
(0.022)
Prenatal care (nurse) 0.042
(0.022)
Prenatal care (none) 0.001
(0.028)
Observations 2,210,676 1,379,640 830,716 1,536,262 674,414 2,206,009
Pseudo R-squared 0.034 0.037 0.030 0.034 0.031 0.034
Notes: This table presents results for the developing country sample splitting by pre- and post-1990, and by country
income level. Main specifications for the developing country sample are pooled for all years. All specifications
include a full set of year of birth and country dummies, and are estimated using a probit model. Average marginal
effects are reported. Height is measured in cm and BMI is weight in kg divided by height in meters squared.
Prenatal care variables refer to average levels of coverage in DHS clusters. These prenatal measures are only
recorded for births in 5 years preceding each survey wave, and as such, a small number of (small) clusters do not
have records available. Standard errors clustered by mothers are presented in parentheses. p < 0.1; p < 0.05;
p < 0.01.
We also investigated whether the source of positive selection of twins additionally
has a direct effect on the outcome of interest. This seems plausible since mothers with
better health stocks and mothers engaging in positive behaviours prior to pregnancy
are likely to be healthier themselves and have stronger preferences over health and
educational investments in children following pregnancy, with direct impacts on child
outcomes. Evidence of positive causal effects of maternal health with child health or
education is not so easy to find but evidence of associations for health is in Uggla
and Mace (2016) and Kahn et al. (2002). We document similar associations using our
analysis samples. The US results are in Table 3. We regress available measures of child
investment (whether the child has any type of health coverage) and outcomes (whether
the child has any health limits, the child’s standardized educational achievement, and
whether the child is classified by parents as being in excellent health), on the maternal
characteristics documented to predict twinning in this sample. In each case, we observe
that positive maternal health measures are correlated with a reduced likelihood of
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TABLE 3. Maternal health and child investments/outcomes (NHIS).
No health Health Education Excellent
insurance limits z-score health
Mother’s education
(years)
0.076 0.009 0.019 0.052
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Mother’s height (in.) 0.007 0.012 0.005 0.020
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Mother’s BMI 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Smoked prior to birth 0.101 0.183 0.046 0.153
(0.016) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011)
Observations 103,502 103,502 74,777 103,502
R-squared/pseudo
R-squared
0.072 0.021 0.019 0.025
Notes: Regressions are presented of child investments or child outcomes on a number of maternal characteristics.
Dependent variables are indicated in column headings. All specifications and variable definitions follow Table 1
and include a full set of mother’s age, survey year, region of birth, and mother’s race dummies. No Health
insurance, health limits and excellent health are binary variables, and models are estimated as probit models.
Education z-score is a standardized score of the child’s completed years of education compared with his or her
birth year and birth month cohort. Height is measured in inches and BMI is weight in kg divided by height in
meters squared. Standard errors are included in parentheses. p < 0.05; p < 0.01.
having health limitations or not having insurance (columns (1) and (2)), and correlated
with positive measures of human capital outcomes (education and self-informed health
status; columns (3) and (4)). The developing country results are in Table 4. Maternal
height, BMI and education are all positively associated with the likelihood of making
more positive antenatal investments in child outcomes (the number of appointments,
and the likelihood of giving birth at home rather than in a medical centre). We also see
impacts of the same maternal health indicators on the child’s education.23
In summary, there is compelling evidence that mothers of twins are selectively
healthy. There is also suggestive evidence that healthier women make greater
investments in children and that their children have better human capital outcomes. We
will test this more formally when progressively introducing controls in IV models in
the following section. Note that previous twin-IV studies cited earlier often control for
parental characteristics including age and education, but not for maternal health (see
Online Appendix Table A.3, which reviews previous twin-IV studies). In Bhalotra and
Clarke (2019) we show that numerous different measures of maternal health have large
and statistically significant impacts on the probability of twin birth (in many different
samples) even after conditioning upon maternal education and age.
23. The maternal health indicators are also all positively associated with infant survival; the reason
this is not displayed is that we do not analyse infant survival as an outcome for the reasons indicated in
footnote 19.
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TABLE 4. Maternal health and child investments/outcomes (developing country sample).
Maternal characteristics With cluster-level health measures
Home Antenatal Education Home Antenatal Education
birth visits z-score birth visits z-score
Mother’s age 0.084 0.024 0.004 0.085 0.030 0.003
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Mother’s age squared 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age at first birth 0.042 0.070 0.009 0.039 0.061 0.008
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Mother’s education
(years)
0.113 0.267 0.079 0.100 0.220 0.075
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Mother’s height (cm) 0.005 0.020 0.005 0.004 0.016 0.005
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Mother’s BMI 0.046 0.076 0.023 0.041 0.060 0.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Prenatal care (doctor) 0.766 1.217 0.066
(0.016) (0.031) (0.008)
Prenatal care (nurse) 0.153 0.092 0.060
(0.016) (0.030) (0.008)
Prenatal care (none) 1.027 3.715 0.438
(0.020) (0.035) (0.010)
Observations 750,213 616,448 1,289,528 750,211 616,446 1,285,129
R-squared/pseudo
R-squared
0.253 0.334 0.138 0.278 0.383 0.145
Notes: Regressions are presented of child investments or child outcomes on a number of maternal characteristics.
All specifications and variable definitions follow Table 2 and include a full set of country and year of birth
fixed effects. Specifications with binary outcome variables (home birth) are estimated using a probit model, and
average marginal effects are reported. Other models are estimated using OLS. Home birth and antenatal visits are
recorded only for children aged 0–4 at the time of the survey, and the standardized education score is recorded
only for children aged 6–18 (of school age). Additional notes are available in Table 2. p < 0.1; p < 0.05;
p < 0.01.
4.2. The Trade-off: Impacts of Fertility on Child Human Capital
We now turn to estimates of the QQ trade-off. We initially present the routine OLS and
twin-IV estimates since, under the assumptions about selection into fertility discussed
in Section 2.1, these provide bounds on the true parameter. In each case, we show
how these estimates are modified upon addition of available controls for the mother’s
health. So as to ascertain that the indicators of health are not simply proxying for socio-
economic status, we also introduce controls for mother’s education. Our expectation
is that the introduction of controls will tighten the bounds, diminishing the size of
the trade-off estimated by OLS and increasing the size of the IV estimated trade-off.
The former would confirm the hypothesis of negative selection into fertility and the
latter would confirm positive selection into twin birth, affording a direct test of our
hypothesis that the twin-IV estimator is biased upwards by virtue of twins being born
to healthier mothers.
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4.2.1. OLS Estimates. OLS results for both samples are in Table 5. We consistently
control for fixed effects for age of the child, age of the mother at birth, child birth
order, and the year of the survey. In the developing country sample we also condition
on country fixed effects, and in the US sample on census region and mother’s race fixed
effects. The available controls for mother’s health are height, BMI and cluster-level
health service availability in the developing country sample, and BMI and a self-
reported assessment of own health on a Likert scale in the US sample. In both samples,
the control for socioeconomic status is years of education of the mother (see Table A.2
for summary statistics of these variables) and in the developing country sample we
also control for the wealth quintile of the family. Given that our interest is in capturing
mother-level variation that predicts twinning, in the models with the richest controls
(labelled +S&H in Table 5) we additionally include quadratic interactions between
continuous measures of maternal health (height and height squared, and BMI and BMI
squared) and categorical variables for maternal education. We note that this sequence
implies that the health and socioeconomic interaction terms will all “load onto” the
last column, when in fact they “belong” in controls for health as much as in controls
for socioeconomic indicators. We chose this ordering as it makes our estimates of
the coefficient change associated with maternal health covariates more conservative,
though we note that, in general these interaction terms have much less impact than
first-order controls. The introduction of observable controls, first for mother’s health
and then also for her education progressively reduces the estimated trade-off to nearly
half of the initial value in both samples, consistent with negative fertility selection.
The adjusted estimates for education in developing countries are between 6.1% and
8.4% of a standard deviation. In the United States they are between 1.1% and 2.4%
for education and between 0.3% and 1.6% for health status. The Altonji et al. (2005)
statistic for the DHS sample suggests that unobservable characteristics of the mother
would need to be about 1–1.2 times as important as observables for these estimate of
the fertility–human capital trade-off to be entirely driven by selection into fertility. The
corresponding ratio in the United States varies from between 1 and 3. In developing
countries, the estimated education-fertility trade-off is decreasing in the birth order
at which twins (the additional child) occur, that is, it is largest in the 2+ sample and
smallest in the 4+ sample. In the United States, the trade-off is similar for the 2+ and
3+ samples and smaller and insignificant in the 4+ sample. However, for health, this
“gradient” is reversed and the largest child health–fertility trade-off is in the 4+ sample
and the smallest in the 2+ sample. In contrast to the case in Black et al. (2005), the
controls for birth order do not eliminate the trade-off (Online Appendix Tables A.4
and A.5).
4.2.2. IV Estimates with the Twin Instrument. IV estimates using the twin instrument
are in Tables 6 (DHS) and 7 (United States), the first-stage estimates are in panel A and
the second stage in panel B. In these Tables we present coefficients on the variable of
interest (fertility), however provide full output of all coefficients in Online Appendix
Tables A.6–A.8.
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IV Estimates: Developing Countries. The first stage estimates demonstrate the well-
known power of the twin instrument. It consistently passes weak instrument tests (the
Kleibergen–Paap rk statistic and its p-value are presented in panel A). The point
estimates indicate that the incidence of twins raises total fertility by about 0.7–0.8
births. That this estimate is always less than one is in line with other estimates in
the twin literature and is evidence of partial reduction of future fertility following
twin births (compensating fertility behaviour). Consistent with this, the first stage
coefficient is increasing in parity. In panel B, the first column (“Base”) for each parity
group presents estimates of Oˇ1 from equation (2) using the current state of the art
twin-IV 2SLS estimator. In each of the three samples, in line with the findings of
recent studies (Black et al. 2005; Ca´ceres-Delpiano 2006; Åslund and Gro¨nqvist 2010;
Angrist et al. 2010; Fitzsimons and Malde 2014), we find no significant trade-off. This
is not simply because IV estimates are less precise than OLS estimates (as emphasized
in Angrist et al. 2010), rather, the coefficients are much smaller.
Consistent with our hypothesis and the evidence we present in Section 4.1 that twin
mothers are positively selected on health (and education), we see that upon introducing
controls for maternal selectors of twinning, a fertility–human capital trade-off emerges
in the 3+ and 4+ samples, even though the available controls are almost certainly
a partial representation of the range of relevant facets of maternal health stocks,
health-related behaviours and environmental influences on foetal health. The bias
adjustment is meaningful and statistically significant. In the 3+ sample, the commonly
estimated specification produces a point estimate of 2.8%, which is not statistically
significant, and partial bias adjustment raises this to 4.1% (conditional on maternal
health indicators) or 4.8% (if mother’s education is also included). In the 4+ sample,
the corresponding figures are 2.7%, 3.8% and 3.6%.24
Although one way to compare the base and full control specifications is to test
whether each coefficient differs from zero, an alternative test is to compare the
estimated coefficients (and standard errors) to each other. We thus also test each
coefficient compared to the “Base” coefficient, and present the p-values of this test
as “Coefficient Difference” at the foot of panel B. We can often reject equality of
the coefficients in the specifications with and without controls for maternal health.
Implementing these tests requires that we take account of the correlations between
error terms in each model. In order to do this we replicate IV estimates using GMM,
which allows us to estimate models simultaneously and hence compare coefficients
across models. Additional details related to this test are provided in Online Appendix C.
IV Estimates: United States. The first stage estimates for the US sample (Table 7)
are similar to those for the developing country sample, with a twin birth at parity 2,
24. We experimented with adding education first, and then health. For example, in the case of the
3+ sample in DHS regressions, the baseline estimate of the trade-off is 2.8%. When we control for just
maternal education, this moves to is 3.8%. When we additionally control for maternal health, it rises to 4.8%.
Crudely, this suggests that maternal education alone accounts for 47% of the movement, whereas the health
indicators explain the remaining 53%. This calculation is: (0.0375–0:0284/=.0:0476–0:0284/ D 0:472.
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3 or 4 leading to an additional 0.7–0.8 total births. The second stage estimates also
follow a similar pattern insofar as the baseline specification indicates no significant
relationship between twin-mediated increases in fertility and either the indicator of
school progression, or the indicator of child health. However, upon the introduction
of controls for maternal health and education, the coefficient describing the fertility–
human capital trade-off tends to increase in magnitude. In the case of education, it
grows more negative in each sample and is statistically significant in the 2+ sample,
with a point estimate of 10.2%. When child quality is indicated by health, the point
estimate in the 2+ sample remains insignificant but in the 3+ and 4+ samples it grows
more negative and in the 3+ sample it is statistically significant at 5.9%.
Notice that the US samples range between about 21,000 and 70,000 individuals
whereas the developing country data samples range between about 260,000 and
400,000, so we have more limited statistical power with the US data. As discussed
earlier in this section, it is well recognized that twin-IV estimates are often not precise,
and indeed, note that in this case IV confidence intervals entirely overlap with the
OLS confidence intervals meaning that formal statements of their relative magnitudes
cannot be made, something we do not observe in the large developing country sample.
So it is quite striking that we find any significant trade-off for education and health.
Overall, partial bias adjustment reveals a statistically significant trade-off for education
in the 2+ sample (comprising about 50% of the total sample) and for health in the 3+
sample (comprising about a third of the total sample).
IV Estimates: Who are the Compliers? We have argued that maternal health is an
omitted variable in the 2SLS model with the twin instrument and that, as a result, the
progressive removal of mother-level twin selection characteristics from the unobserved
term in IV models will render them progressively more negative. However, as discussed
in Section 2.1.1, introducing controls changes the complier group and LATE identified
in the linear IV model. There are two potential issues here, (i) non-linearity—the
inclusion of controls may change the weighting across parities and (ii) heterogeneous
effects—inclusion of controls may change the weighting on households with different
characteristics (e.g., high vs. low maternal health).
First, inclusion of additional covariates may change the weights assigned to fertility
change occurring at different parities. Angrist et al. (2010) show that the estimated
impact is a weighted average of the variation in fertility at each birth induced by the
twin birth. They demonstrate that the weights correspond to the first stage impact
of twin birth at birth k on an indicator of fertility exceeding each particular parity
j , denoted dj i  1Œfertilityi  j  8j 2 .k C 1/; : : : ; 11. We replicate Angrist et al.
(2010)’s weighting estimates in Figure 3, regressing each dj i on the twin birth indicator,
including identical controls as in each IV model. Our innovation here is that as well
as estimating these parity-specific weights for the baseline model, we document how
these weights change when additionally adding socioeconomic and health covariates.
We observe, as also found by Angrist et al. (2010), that twin births have the largest
impact on fertility at parities close to the parity of twin birth, but that twins also impact
the likelihood of exceeding higher birth parities, and this is much more so in the
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developing country sample where access to contraceptives is lower.25 Importantly, we
note that the weights are very stable to adding additional controls. This suggests that
heterogeneity in fertility impacts owing to inclusion of the additional covariates does
not explain the change in the IV estimates that we see with these additional covariates.
Second, parameter heterogeneity in LATEs for different groups of mothers may
explain the coefficient movements we observe, for instance, Brinch et al. (2017)
document considerable heterogeneity in effects of fertility on children’s education. In
a fully saturated model, 2SLS estimates correspond to a weighted average of covariate
specific LATEs, with the weights assigned to each group determined by the conditional
variance of the first stage fitted value at each point of support of the covariates
(Angrist and Pischke 2009). Thus it is possible that the more negative coefficients
we observe in our 2SLS estimates after we add controls for socioeconomic and health
characteristics arise because larger weights are assigned to groups with more negative
LATEs. However, as shown in Angrist and Pischke, the covariate specific weights
will be larger for groups with more instrumental variation. In our case, given that the
twin instrument is a binary variable, the variance of the instrument will be increasing
in the proportion of twins.26 Our evidence suggests that twins are positively selected
on maternal characteristics. Since the proportion of twins is significantly lower than
0.5 in any population group, the weight given to the LATE of any group will be
increasing in the rate of twin births, so positively selected groups (healthier and more
educated mothers) will be given larger weights in the 2SLS estimates conditional
on these controls. We posit that these positively selected groups will have smaller
fertility–human capital trade-offs (and we document this later in the paper using
maternal education). In this case, adding health and socioeconomic controls will give
larger weights to mothers with smaller trade-offs. Based on this line of reasoning, if
anything, heterogeneity in LATEs will cause our estimates to be move upwards and
closer to zero when adding controls, so our finding that the coefficients become more
negative are unlikely to owe to heterogeneity, and our IV bounds argument holds a
fortiori.
4.2.3. Non-Linear Models. Theoretical statements of the QQ model tend to assume,
for simplicity, that all children in a family have the same endowments and receive the
same parental investments. More recent work, for example, the theoretical work of
Aizer and Cunha (2012), and empirical papers by Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009),
Brinch et al. (2017), Mogstad and Wiswall (2016), Bagger et al. (2013) relax
this assumption. Among other things, this allows for reinforcing or compensating
25. For the United States, we estimate that twins at second birth increase the chances of exceeding a
family size of 3 by 60%, and the chances of exceeding a family size of 4 by 10%, and have no impact
on the chances of exceeding family sizes of 5 or larger. In developing countries, a twin birth at order 2
increases the chances of exceeding family sizes of 3 up to 9.
26. This is provided that the proportion of twins does not exceed 0.5. Note that the variance of a binary
variable is p.1  p/, where p is the proportion of observations for which the variable is equal to 1. This
value is increasing between p D 0 and p D 0:5, and then decreasing up until p D 1.
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behaviours in parental investment choices (Almond and Mazumder 2013). This implies
that we should allow the coefficient ˇ1 to vary across children in the family.
Using DHS data for which we have a sufficiently large sample to split instruments,
we re-estimate our regressions following the non-linear marginal fertility models of
Brinch et al. (2017) and Mogstad and Wiswall (2016). Models of this type loosen the
assumption of linear marginal effects estimated on fertility, and allow for a one-unit
shift in fertility at different birth orders to have potentially varied impacts on existing
children. The restricted (linear) and unrestricted (non-linear) IV models are in Table 8,
and we report results by the same parity samples as the main IV results in Table 6.
In Table 8 we observe, firstly, that as described in Table 6, the linear specifications
are universally lower (more negative), and often become statistically significant when
partially controlling for the selection of twins. The only difference in these linear results
and those reported earlier in that we now restrict the sample to families with 6 or fewer
children in line with results in Mogstad and Wiswall (2016), which involves a loss of
between 5% and 18% of the sample depending on the parity sample used. Descriptive
statistics on family size in each parity group are in Online Appendix Figure A.7. Panel
B reports non-linear estimates, which confirm the results in Mogstad and Wiswall
(2016). For example, in the two-plus sample, we observe that the twin instrumented
estimate of the effect of moving from one to two siblings is large and positive, whereas
the impact of moving from two to three siblings is large and negative.
However, what is most pertinent to the present analysis is that the coefficients in
the non-linear model are nearly universally more negative when partially controlling
for twin selection. As was the case with the linear model, we observe that the marginal
fertility effects become nearly everywhere more negative, and in some cases become
statistically significant. Thus, our finding that the twin-IV estimator tends to under-
estimate the magnitude of the causal effect of fertility on child human capital holds
in the linear and non-linear specifications. Departing from any previous work, we
investigated a further generalization that is pertinent to our purpose. In addition to
allowing for differential effects of additional children at each level of family size,
we allow these differential effects of family size to vary with the health and SES
of the mother. It seems plausible that the impact of maternal health could be quite
different when considering a change of family size from one to two children versus
a change in family size from three to four children. The final column of each panel
in Table 8 shows estimates allowing these interactions. The trade-off parameter is not
significantly changed and our main result—that controlling for mother’s health and
SES sharpens the trade-off—holds a fortiori.
4.2.4. IV Effect Sizes in Perspective. Since the fertility–human capital trade-off has
been called into question, it is important to consider the size of the partially bias-
adjusted estimates and not just their sign and statistical significance. Using summary
statistics from Table A.2, we can convert standardized estimates into years of education.
Our results (in the linear model) imply that an additional birth in a family is associated
with between 0.04 (2+) and 0.15 (3+) fewer years of completed education (developing
countries) or 0.06 to 0.5 fewer grades progressed (United States). In a widely cited
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study, Jensen (2010) shows that providing students with information on the returns
to secondary school in their area led, on average, to their completing 0.20–0.35 more
years of school over the next four years. In a similarly high-profile experiment, Baird
et al. (2016) find that de-worming in school led to an increase of 0.26 years of schooling
and Bhalotra and Venkataramani (2013) find that a 1 s.d. decrease in under-5 diarrheal
mortality (11 deaths per 1000 live births) is associated with girls growing up to achieve
an additional 0.38 years of schooling, whereas both studies find no increase in school
years for boys. Almond (2006) finds that foetal exposure to influenza in 1918 was asso-
ciated with 0.126 years (1.5 months) less schooling at the cohort-level and Bhalotra and
Venkataramani (2014) show that exposure to antibiotic-led reductions in pneumonia
in infancy resulted in individuals completing 0.7 additional years of education in
adulthood relative to unexposed cohorts. The PROGRESA cash transfer in Mexico is
estimated to have generated a 0.66 increase in years of schooling (Schultz 2004).
If we consider grade retention in the United States, our estimates are of similar
magnitude to estimates of the effect of an additional 1,000 grams of birth weight over
the normal birth weight range (a 0.31 increase in years of schooling) in Royer (2009),
and estimates of the impact of historical exposure to high rather than low malaria rates
(a 0.4 year reduction) in Barreca (2010). Turning to the effects on health, we find that
an additional birth (at order 3 or 4) reduces the likelihood that siblings are in excellent
health by between 3% and 6%. Almond and Mazumder (2005) document that in the
long-run, the 1918 influenza pandemic increased the likelihood of being in poor or fair
health (the inverse of our health measure) by 10%. Overall, the adjusted estimates are
of a size that it is not prudent to dismiss. Moreover, our estimates indicate the change
in investment (education or health) for one additional birth but, as fertility rates remain
high in many developing countries, the total effect can be large.
4.2.5. Parental Investment Behaviour as a Response to Twinning. A twin birth is
used to instrument fertility because it creates an unexpected increment to family size.
To recapitulate, our critique has centred upon mothers of twins being selected, in
particular, mothers of twins are systematically healthier. In this section, we consider
whether it matters for the current analysis that the twin births themselves are less
healthy. Twins are lower birth weight than singleton births and closely spaced.27
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) made the observation that if parents reinforce the
initial endowment (as they find in China), then they will tend to allocate resources
away from the low-endowment twins to other children in the family and, in this case,
we will tend to under-estimate the QQ trade-off (i.e., our IV subjects, the pre-twins,
may gain higher education than in the absence of reinforcement). The same arguments
hold for close birth spacing of twins as for low birth weight of twins. Close spacing
may make investments in twins more costly, as suggested by Rosenzweig and Zhang
(2009) and, thereby, encourage parents to shift investments to pre-twin children.28
27. Refer to Online Figures A.3–A.4. Our data suggest birth weight differentials of 697 g in the developing
country sample, and 885 g in the United States.
28. It is interesting to note that this birth-spacing effect may flow not only from compliers but additionally
from always-takers (individuals who would have had an additional birth if they had not had twins). To
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If, as Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) suggest, parents reinforce child endowments,
their argument provides a reason independent of our argument for why twin-IV
estimates will tend to be upwards biased. This said, if the lower endowments of
twins were the only challenge to IV, then adjusting for maternal health would not
produce the coefficient shifts that we document.29
There is nevertheless the potential concern that parents may compensate rather than
reinforce the child endowment. There is some evidence of this, for instance among
more educated mothers Conley (2008) and Hsin (2012). If parents compensate, and if
this is more so among relatively educated and healthy mothers who are more likely to
have twins, then this may act to offset the bias that we highlight (the positive selection
of twin births). If this were the case, it is no longer clear that we can sign the bias
on IV estimates. To investigate this concern, we examine parental investments in a
child in response to their endowment, and the endowment of their subsequent siblings.
We extend this analysis to look at heterogeneity in parental responses to endowments
by the education of the mother. As we do find heterogeneity, we repeat our earlier
investigation of how OLS and twin-IV estimates vary upon adjusting for maternal
characteristics that predict twin birth, but now we separate the sample into more versus
less educated mothers. We similarly allow heterogeneity by an indicator of the health
of the mother.
Tables 9 and 10 present estimates of parental investment responses to initial
endowments, measured by birth weight. We also present responses to whether or
not the child is a twin. As twins have lower birth weight, we show the twin coefficient
conditional and unconditional on birth weight, expecting that the conditional case will
capture other factors like the close spacing of twins. We use a panel of mothers from
the DHS and, since this is not feasible with the NHIS, for the United States, we use the
NLSY. The indicator for parental investment in the developing country sample is the
duration of breastfeeding in months, available for each child born to DHS mothers for
whom breastfeeding is complete. For the US sample, we model two investments, both
binary, indicating whether or not the mother breastfeeds and reads frequently with her
child. We consistently condition on mother fixed effects to purge effects of the mother’s
(time invariant) health and socioeconomic status on their investment behaviour and
see this, note that there are no never-takers from the twin-instrument (twinning must always shift fertility
for those with the instrument switched on), and so from Imbens and Wooldridge (2007) we can write the
numerator of the LATE term as
EŒY
i
jZ
i
D 1  EŒY
i
jZ
i
D 0 D
ŒE.Y
i
jZ
i
D 1; complier/
c
C E.Y
i
jZ
i
D 1; always  takers/
a

 ŒE.Y
i
jZ
i
D 0; complier/
c
C E.Y
i
jZ
i
D 0; always  takers/
a
;
where 
c
and 
a
refer to the proportions of compliers and always-takers respectively. If the exclusion
restriction holds, E.Y
i
jZ
i
D 1; always-takers/ D E.Y
i
jZ
i
D 0; always-takers/, and so the IV estimand is
local to compliers. However, if birth spacing due to twins impacts investments in other children, this
equality may not hold. If the effect of birth spacing on investments in other children is similar for both
compliers and always-takers, the always-takers will additionally contribute to the inconsistency in IV
estimates, in the same way that the compliers do.
29. Notice that our argument refers to cross-mother differences (that influence the chances of twin vs.
singleton birth) and highlight within-family re-allocations (between twin and singleton siblings).
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their twinning chances. We also control for fixed effects for the age of the mother, the
age of the child, birth order, and child sex.
In the full sample, we observe that breastfeeding is longer for higher birth weight
children (increasing by 0.30.4 months per additional kilogram of birth weight), in line
with reinforcing behaviour. And, in line with this, unconditional on birth weight, twins
are breastfed for around 1.9 months less than singletons. In the DHS sample, where
twins weigh on average 697 grams less than singletons, this translates to a birth weight
impact of twins of 0:445  0:697 D 0:31 months less breastfeeding. Conditional on
birth weight, twins are still breastfed for around 1.6 months less than singletons,
consistent with their close spacing that makes it harder to breastfeed both twins.
In panel A of Table 10 estimates from the NLSY similarly show that American
mothers’ breastfeeding responses are to reinforce the birth weight endowment. The
coefficient on the twin indicator has a sign consistent with reinforcement but it
not statistically significant in this sample. Note, though, that the NLSY measure of
breastfeeding is binary, and so we cannot rule out that the twin indicator influences
the duration of breastfeeding conditional on breastfeeding. In the developing country
and American samples, the results for breastfeeding behaviour are broadly similar
for women with educational attainment below and above their country-level average
(columns (4)–(9)).
Panel B of Table 10 investigates using the NLSY whether the mother read to the
child frequently during the ages 6–9 years. Overall, and for women with no college, we
can detect no significant response of reading to the child endowment but, for women
with college, we see evidence of compensating behaviour, consistent with Hsin (2012).
The estimates in panels A and B describe parental investments in a child responding
to the endowment of that child. However, the typical twin IV experiment consists
of examining the impact of a twin birth on their older siblings. We investigate this in
panel C, using reading in the NLSY and limiting the estimation sample to children who
have younger siblings.30 We find no significant impact associated with birth weight.
However, among women without a college education, we find that mothers with twins
read less to children born before the twins (column (5)). This seems plausible as
maternal time may be so stretched after having twins that investments may fall for all
children in the family. It demonstrates that, in contrast to the common assumption in
the literature, reinforcing behaviour may not imply that siblings born prior to twins
receive more resources when twins are born, and we expect this will vary with the type
of investment we consider.
Overall, the results in this section suggest that our running argument that twin IV
estimates act as an upper bound on the impact of fertility on child outcomes will hold
in the DHS sample, and likely in the US sample for women with no college provided
that reinforcing behaviours dominate any direct impact of twin births (as suggested
by coefficient movements discussed in the following paragraph). However, for women
30. We cannot conduct this test using the developing country data because we do not observe investments
for different siblings.
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TABLE 11. Maternal education, the twin instrument and the fertility–human capital trade-off.
OLS IV
Base +H +S&H Base +H +S&H
Panel A: Developing country results
Fertility (less educated) 0.099 0.085 0.068 0.034 0.042 0.043
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Observations 366,799 366,799 366,799 366,799 366,799 366,799
Fertility (more educated) 0.094 0.084 0.055 0.024 0.031 0.029
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Observations 247,258 247,258 247,258 247,258 247,258 247,258
Panel B: US results
Dependent variable D school z-score
Fertility (less educated) 0.030 0.029 0.022 0.015 0.015 0.022
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
Observations 41,733 41,733 41,733 41,733 41,733 41,733
Fertility (more educated) 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.094 0.098 0.098
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Observations 46,553 46,553 46,553 46,553 46,553 46,553
Dependent variable D excellent health
Fertility (less educated) 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.053 0.051 0.051
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.038) (0.031) (0.031)
Observations 49,050 49,050 49,050 49,050 49,050 49,050
Fertility (more educated) 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.012 0.012
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
Observations 54,070 54,070 54,070 54,070 54,070 54,070
Notes: OLS and IV results are shown for the pooled 2+, 3+ and 4+ samples, splitting samples by the educational
level of each mother. In the case of IV estimates, fertility is instrumented using the twin instruments with
pooling procedure described in Angrist et al. (2010) and refinement discussed in Mogstad and Wiswall (2012).
In the developing country sample, less and more educated refers to mothers with education, respectively, below
and above the country-level mean (calculated in each survey) given heterogeneity in educational attainment by
countries. In the case of the United States, less educated refers to mothers with high school education or less, and
more educated refers to mothers with college education or higher. All other details follow OLS and IV estimates
in Tables 5–7. p < 0.1; p < 0.05; p < 0.01.
with college in the United States, our observation that one of two studied investments
compensates birth weight may mean that we cannot necessarily sign the bounds. To
examine this, we present IV estimates separating the more and less educated samples in
Table 11, using the same educational splits as in Tables 9 and 10. Splitting the sample
challenges statistical power and the IV estimates are imprecise, particularly for the
smaller US sample, so we now present pooled estimates (described in the Section 2).
We discuss pooled estimates in the full sample in the following section (Figure 4). We
also present OLS estimates as they are more precise, and they provide an alternative
metric indicating the nature of the bias through covariate adjustment.
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In the developing country sample, we observe that the inclusion of covariates
tends to move OLS point estimates upwards (towards zero), shift IV point estimates
downwards (away from zero), and to produce a clearly negative relationship in the
less educated sample. These results are in line with our main argument of positive
selection of mothers of twins. In the US data, the less educated sample behaves
broadly like the developing country sample. However in the sample of more educated
mothers, the inclusion of controls typically does not increase OLS estimates, or lead
to the emergence of statistically significant trade-offs in conditional IV models.31 We
obtain broadly similar results splitting by an indicator of maternal health rather than
education, see Online Appendix Table A.10. In summary, our findings suggest that it
can be instructive not only to allow for heterogeneity in treatment effects by maternal
characteristics that influence investments in children, but to model and account for
parental responses to birth endowments over and above allowing for positive selection
into twin births (the latter being the issue that we emphasize because it has not been
rigorously assessed before).
4.3. Bounding the QQ Trade-off
The adjusted twin-IV results will not provide consistent estimates of ˇ1 as there
are almost certainly omitted indicators of maternal health.32 Rather than discard
the twin-IV estimator altogether, we harness its power in predicting fertility using
IV bounds to assess the empirical significance of the omitted variables. Figure 4
presents the range of the alternative linear bounds estimates discussed in Section 2.2,
along with the corresponding OLS and IV estimates with base controls, health, and
health and socioeconomic controls. In each case we present the bound end points
(or point estimates) along with the 95% confidence intervals associated with each
parameter/partially identified set. We present results for the 2+, 3+ and 4+ samples,
as well as for the pooled sample using the methodology discussed in Section 2.1.1.
Figure 4 is based on bound estimates for the developing country DHS data that are
sufficiently large.33
As discussed previously, OLS estimates tend to be more negative than the true
estimate and IV estimates, more positive. The inclusion of controls for maternal health
in the IV models makes the point estimates more negative, and/or increases their
precision. Nevo and Rosen bounds are based on the premise of opposite directions
31. Comparing these results with those in Tables 6 (DHS) and 7 (United States), note that the parity-
specific results are typically only significant at one parity, so that pooling across parities as we do here, we
lose significance. The coefficient movements are nevertheless illustrative for the current purpose.
32. Although documenting that observable measures of health (which also impact child quality) are
correlated with the instrument does not prove instrumental invalidity, it does suggest that it is highly likely
that similar non-observable factors will also be correlated, thus resulting in invalidity.
33. The NHIS data contain only 21,000–70,000 observations (depending on the parity sample), about
10%–15% of the DHS sample. As highlighted by Angrist et al. (2010), the twin IV estimator is typically
under-powered. When we construct confidence intervals for bounds, we further challenge statistical power.
Still, we do discuss bounds for the American NHIS sample, albeit imprecise, in the following section.
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FIGURE 4. Parameter and bound estimates of the Q–Q trade-off. Each set of estimates refer to
the 95% confidence intervals on parameter bounds of the impact of fertility on child education.
Two-plus, three-plus and four-plus refer to parity specific groups, and pooled estimates refer to
these samples pooled following the procedure described in Angrist et al. (2010) and refinement
discussed in Mogstad and Wiswall (2012). Base IV refer to the IV estimate most closely following
the existing literature, with +H and +S&H presenting IV estimates controlling for maternal health
and socioeconomic variables. OLS point estimates are presented along with their 95% confidence
intervals, which are quite narrow. OLS estimates include all maternal controls (corresponding to base,
and +S&H). Versions without maternal controls are even more negative. The final two sets of bounds
in each group are estimated following Nevo and Rosen (2012) and Conley et al. (2012) procedures,
and do not have a corresponding point estimate. Confidence intervals on Nevo and Rosen bounds are
estimated following Chernozhukov et al. (2013). Upper and lower end points of the interval estimates
are plotted with hollow circles.
of selectivity into fertility and twinning, and are approximately bounded between
the IV estimate as the upper bound and the OLS estimate as the lower bound. Where
multiple potential upper or lower bound candidates exist, inference is based on adaptive
inequality selection. Conley et al. IV bounds can lead to tightening of the upper bound
(as we discuss in what follows and document in Figure 5). The estimates in Figure 4
are based on the UCI approach in Conley et al., with priors allowing for the exclusion
restriction to fall anywhere between 0 (in which case the IV is valid) and 0.008, in
which case being born to a twin mother implies a direct benefit of 0.8% of a standard
deviation in educational outcomes beyond the impact mediated by fertility. A discussion
of the calculation of these priors is provided in Bhalotra and Clarke (2016), though we
document robustness to alternative priors in the following paragraphs. We also note
that this is providing quite a wide range for the failure of the exclusion restriction, as
0.8% of a standard deviation is around 20% of the total estimated impact of fertility
on school outcomes in the largest IV estimate (the 3+ sample).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvz058/5686856 by guest on 07 January 2020
42 Journal of the European Economic Association
−
.
12
−
.
1
−
.
08
−
.
06
−
.
04
−
.
02
β
0 .01 .02 .03 .04 .05
δ
Point Estimate (LTZ) 95% CI
Methodology described in Conley et al. (2012)
FIGURE 5. Plausibly exogenous bounds: school z-score. Confidence intervals and point estimates
are calculated according to Conley et al. (2012) using DHS data for the 3+ sample. Estimates reflect
a range of priors regarding the validity of the exclusion restriction required to consistently estimate
Oˇ
1 using twinning in a 2SLS framework. The local to zero (LTZ) approach treats the uncertainty
surrounding  , the coefficient on the instrument when included in the structural equation, as being
normally distributed, with the mean and variance of a U.0; ı/ variable. The vertical dashed line
indicates the point at which priors are comparable to those in Figure 4.
The informativeness of the bounds is evaluated against the criteria laid out by Hotz
et al. (1997): first do the bounds enable us to determine if the effect is negative or
positive, second can we reject the point estimates of linear IV, and third do our bounds
allow us to reject the OLS estimate. In general, for the 3+, 4+ and pooled samples in
the DHS data, the bounds are informative of the (negative) sign of the trade-off, but
not for the 2+ sample. In terms of the second and third criteria, we can never exclude
the point estimate of the original IV estimate from our bounds, however in the case
of 2+ and pooled estimates we often can reject the original OLS estimate, which is
important given recent evidence that many IV estimates are inaccurate, and frequently
include OLS point estimates in their confidence intervals (Young 2018).
Once again, using summary statistics from Table A.2, we can convert standardized
estimates from these bounds into years of education. The estimated pooled effect of
fertility shocks on education from Conley et al.’s bounds is between around 4 and
5% of a standard deviation. Using the standard deviation in the sample of 3.15 years,
this implies an average effect of around 0.120.15 years of education per additional
sibling at the age of 11 years (the average age in the sample). In the case of the US
estimates, where the s.d. of years of education is 3.85 years, the average estimated
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effect based on the pooled bounds estimates is 8%–9% of a standard deviation in
grade retention, which equates to a marginal effect of 0.3–0.36 years of education. On
average the likelihood of the child being in excellent health in the American sample
falls by 1%–2% according to the pooled bounds estimates. Overall, these are quite large
effects relative to the marginal effects of different policy interventions considered in
the literature (see Section 4.2.4).
Although Nevo-Rosen bounds are based on simple direction-of-selection
arguments, Conley et al. bounds are based on priors over the failure of the exclusion
restriction. In Figure 4 we present bounds based on quite a broad prior, so we
investigated sensitivity to the choice of prior in Figure 5. We follow Conley et al.
(2012) in plotting bounds estimates under their “LTZ” assumptions, for a series of priors
imposing  (the measure of the violation of the exclusion restriction) to be normally
distributed, with the mean and variance of a U.0; ı/ variable. On the horizontal axis,
we denote each value of ı considered, and on the vertical axis, the resulting confidence
intervals and bound mid-point estimates. Figure 5 provides these estimates for the
DHS 3+ sample, other parity specific estimates and pooled estimates are discussed
in robustness checks in what follows. In general, note that regardless of priors over
the violation of the exclusion restriction, these bounds are informative, though they
do widen considerably when priors that imply very strong violations of the exclusion
restriction are entertained.
So far we have discussed bounds on parameters in linear models. The cost of
presenting linear bounds is that they may hide considerable heterogeneity within an
average parameter estimate. The benefit of the linear bounds, on the other hand, is
that they tend to be tighter than earlier non-parametric versions of IV bounds, such as
the Monotone IV bounds of Manski and Pepper (2000) if the underlying assumptions
are correct. We estimated Monotone IV bounds, but given that such bounds impose
very weak assumptions, namely a bound on outcome variables and monotonicity in
IV, the resulting bounds are too wide to allow any firm conclusions. In theory, these
bounds provide a partially identified comparison to the non-linear models discussed
in Section 4.2.3, however, as observed in other implementations of “worst-case” non-
parametric IV bounds such as those presented in Brinch et al. (2017), the bounds
are non-informative. We provide precise values of these non-parametric bounds in
Online Appendix D. We additionally document the MTS–MTR bounds, though as
discussed in the Methods section and at more length in Online Appendix D, these
bounds require us to make sign restrictions on the fertility–human capital trade-off
such that we would have to assume that it does exist, which would defeat the purpose
of the current analysis. In this case, we are able to considerably tighten estimated
lower bounds (upper bounds are 0 by construction), and these lower bounds on the
non-parametric ATE are generally comparable in magnitude to lower bounds estimated
on the LATE documented previously. As we document in Online Appendix D, lower
bounds range from slightly less than zero to around 0.2 standard deviations for
child educational outcomes. What’s more, as is the case with the non-linear estimates
that follow Mogstad and Wiswall (2016), the MTS–MTR lower bounds become more
negative as fertility shifts occur at higher parities.
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4.4. Robustness and Extensions
We undertake a number of robustness and extensions to the methods discussed in the
previous sections, results of which are presented in the Online Appendix. A recent
study proposes a formal test of instrument invalidity (Kitagawa 2015). Using this test
on the 2+ sample for the DHS data, we reject the validity of the twin instrument,
see Online Appendix Figure A.8 and Table A.12. However this test is sensitive to
curse of dimensionality considerations, and so to implement it we had to simplify the
specification of controls.34 We do not report results for the NHIS data because the
sample is too small to obtain informative confidence intervals.
There is evidence to suggest that conception of monozygotic (MZ) twins is quasi-
random even if conception of dizygotic (DZ) twins is not (Farbmacher et al. 2016).
Since our argument pertains to the role of maternal health in ensuring survival of twin
conceptions to birth, this distinction may not be relevant. We nevertheless subjected
our argument to a harsher test by using only same sex twins to construct the twin
instrument, as same-sex twins are more likely to be MZ (since our data do not identify
MZ vs. DZ). Even with this restriction, we observe a similar pattern, of estimates of the
fertility–human capital trade-off diverging from zero and becoming significant when
controls for maternal health are included. See results for the DHS in Online Appendix
Table A.13 and for the NHIS in Online Appendix Table A.14.
In Online Appendix Figure A.9 we present a series of bounds for the US sample,
similar to those plotted for the DHS sample in Figure 4. The smaller sample results in
considerably wider 95% confidence intervals. Additionally, given that IV confidence
intervals often contain OLS parameters, the Nevo-Rosen bounds cross or flip in certain
cases (suggesting incorrect identifying assumptions), and in these cases of bound
crossing they are suppressed from the figure. We document the full set of linear
bounds, OLS, and IV estimates along with their confidence intervals in Table A.10.
This includes the few cases of crossing bounds in US data. Here we additionally
provide a preferred set of Conley et al. (2012) bounds based on the LTZ approach, as
described in Figure 5. Identical robustness tests of Conley et al. bounds are provided
for the US 3+ sample in Figure A.10, and for alternative samples and pooled estimates
in Online Appendix Figures A.11 (developing countries) and A.12 (United States).
Finally, we present bounds estimates using the twin instrument together with the
sex-mix instrument (an indicator for whether each of the first 2, 3 or 4 children in
a family were of the same sex, for the 2+, 3+ and 4+ families, respectively). This
strategy has been implemented in Angrist et al. (2010) and Chesher and Rosen (2013,
2018). We present bounds for the DHS and the smaller NHIS samples as Online
Appendix Figures A.13–A.14.35 As documented in Chesher and Rosen (2013), the sex
34. In particular, the inclusion of a large number of fixed effects is prohibitive, and so we replace country
and mother year of birth fixed effects with continent and decade of birth fixed effects, respectively.
35. Note that in the case of Nevo and Rosen’s bounds with multiple instruments we follow their
Proposition 5, which suggests using the minima of all IV estimates where each instrument is used separately,
rather than a 2SLS model where all instruments are entered together.
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mix instrument is considerably weaker than the twin instrument, and so its inclusion
does little to tighten bounds.
5. Conclusion and Discussion
This paper demonstrates that twin-IV estimates of the fertility–human capital trade-off
tend to be biased upwards (towards zero) on account of positive selection of women
into twin birth, a problem that has not been previously recognized. We show that
even partially correcting for twin endogeneity is sufficient to push estimates of the
relationship down by about 2% of a standard deviation. Using partial identification to
bound the effect of child quantity on child quality suggests that the true effect size may
be as large as 9% of a standard deviation, though end point estimates of the upper
bound are typically closer to 1% to 3%.
We conclude that additional unexpected births do have quantitatively important
effects on their siblings’ educational outcomes. The estimated 4% to 5% of a
standard deviation impact in developing countries is equivalent to 0.12–0.15 fewer
years in the classroom, and estimates of approximately 8% of a standard deviation
in the United States implies 0.3 fewer grades progressed on average. As detailed in
the Introduction, the implications of these findings are far-reaching, not only in terms
of vindication of Beckerian theory but because they guide fertility control policies.
A recent survey of national governments suggests that fertility was perceived as too
high in 50% of developing countries, with this figure rising to 86% among the least
developed countries (United Nations 2010).
Any human capital costs of fertility are naturally of greater concern not only when
fertility is high but also when a large share of it is unwanted. In 2015 the average
number of births per woman in low income countries was five and, comparing actual
with stated desired fertility, we estimate the share of unwanted births is as high as 60%
in some countries, with a mean of 27%. Unwanted fertility is not unique to poorer
countries. For instance, despite access to contraceptive methods, 21% of all pregnancies
in 2011 in the United States ended in elective abortion (Guttmacher Institute 2016).
Moreover, there is a strong trend in IVF use, and up to 40% of IVF successes result
in multiple births to women who wanted one child (Kulkarni et al. 2013), creating a
growing set of unwanted children. This might exacerbate impacts of additional births
on investments in preceding births.
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